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Preamble
The Archaeological Review from Cambridge (ARC) has, since 
its inception in 1981, successfully kept its finger on the pulse of 
contemporary thinking in archaeology. Its many issues over the years 
have ranged from insightful commentaries on innovative theoretical 
trends—for example Affective Archaeology (Carman and Meredith 
1990)—to more focused methodological explorations—Science and 
the Material Record (Hall and Parikh 2012)—and even critical 
debates on key ethical issues—Women in Archaeology (Arnold et al. 
1988). More recently, contributions have covered such diverse topics 
as disease (Parkinson and Talbot 2017), deviancy (Damman and 
Leggett 2018) and deserts (Alday and Morrisset 2019). In all cases, the 
research-based papers and editorials have been written by scholars 
from across the global academic community and at various stages in 
their respective careers, making the ARC a remarkably broad ranging 
journal in both content and authorship. Add to this achievement the 
fact that it is produced entirely by graduate students, and the ARC can 
be regarded as a truly impressive publication—one that is rightfully 
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well renowned within the wider field of archaeology. In this latest 
issue we are proud to continue the ARC’s explicitly theoretical tack, 
turning to the theme of posthumanism and its potential applications 
within our discipline. Both posthumanism itself and its archaeological 
manifestations to date are incredibly diverse, and so what follows is 
by necessity a somewhat partial overview. However, we hope it proves 
of some utility in assessing the present state of the field, and a suitable 
introduction to the papers contained within this volume.
Posthumanism…
‘Posthumanism’ has become an increasingly visible term over the past 
decade or so, both within the academy and more broadly. However, 
as it encompasses a great range of ideas and issues, it can be hard 
to define what it actually is. In many ways, this heterogeneity lies 
at posthumanism’s conceptual core—a gathering of intellectual 
perspectives that share as a basic tenet the belief that the human 
subject should not be regarded as a stable or bounded substance 
with ontological primacy over other beings/things, but rather a 
decentred phenomenon constituted within immanent networks 
or flows (a general theoretical position often referred to as a ‘flat 
ontology’). Contrary to the prevailing post-modern critique of the 
previous century, there is also a tendency within posthuman thought 
to move beyond discursive subjectivity/inter-subjectivity to consider 
the actual material qualities and affects that realise/drive processes 
of becoming, involving not just humans as biological creatures 
but a whole host of other lifeforms, objects, energies, etc. This 
heterogeneity is reflected in posthumanism’s eclectic intellectual 
ancestors, common inspiration being found in the familiar corpus 
of French post-modernism, including Michel Foucault, Jean-François 
Lyotard, Luce Irigaray and Jacques Derrida, and notably Giles 
Deleuze and Felix Guattari , but also other philosophers/theorists 
such as Baruch Spinoza, Henri Bergson, Martin Heidegger, Bruno 
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Latour, Gregory Bateson and Niklas Luhmann. In order to break 
down this bewildering array of writers and ideas, we focus below on 
a few themes that have characterised recent debates that either draw 
directly on posthumanist thinking or else share notable common 
ground with it.
Katherine Hayles was one of the first academic commentators to write 
extensively on ‘posthumanism’ as a specific term, particularly its 
relationship to the rapidly developing technologies of the twentieth 
century. Drawing on the cybernetic advances of the 1940s (most 
notably Turing’s ‘imitation game’ test for true AI) and onwards, 
she argued that intelligence, and indeed consciousness, were no 
longer seen as purely human qualities, nor that there was a distinct 
demarcation between bodily experience and computer-based 
simulation (Hayles 1999: 3). However, she went on to critique this 
position with an affirmation of the centrality of embodiment to human 
consciousness, even if such embodiment is liable to change through 
technological mediation (Hayles 1999: 283–284). Importantly, 
she also drew attention to the ways in which participatory systems 
increasingly encompass far greater cognitive capacity than that 
which any single individual (human or otherwise) could hope to 
marshal (Hayles 1999: 289). These two claims lie at the heart of 
much contemporary posthumanist discourse—that the physical and 
material world is integral to systems of cognition and affect, and that 
these are widely distributed rather than intrinsic to specific bounded 
entities. 
Building on this technological focus, some of the most critical and 
impactful posthumanist writing has pursued an explicitly feminist 
agenda. Donna Haraway’s A Cyborg Manifesto (originally published 
in 1985 and reprinted in Haraway 1990: 149–182) was an important 
forerunner in this regard, in which she adopted the concept of the 
‘cyborg’ as a rejection of falsely rigid boundaries between different 
categories of being (such as human/animal) in a critique of then-
prevalent feminist identity politics. Haraway's cyborg is not a 
simplistic, cybernetically-enhanced human subject, but a chimeric 
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entity comprised of a shifting assemblage of partial (sometimes even 
paradoxical) relations. Her approach here is processual, emphasising 
the body in constant motion and the implications this has for both 
individuals and, crucially, more diffuse social realities. Rosi Braidotti’s 
writings on ‘matter-realist’ feminism (Braidotti 2011: 127–149) follow 
a similar vein and have had great impact within critical cultural 
studies. She too adopts an explicitly materialist stance, grounded 
in the human body and its increasingly technological mediation, 
and emphasises that both gender and sexual difference operate 
along an endless scale of subtle gradations rather than occupying 
discrete categories. This formulation abandons ‘subjects’ in favour of 
‘subjectivity’, the latter of which is intimately connected to broader 
social and material relations. Definitions of common humanity 
thus become “qualitative complexities, not quantitative pluralities” 
(Braidotti 2011: 145). 
In displacing the very idea of ‘the subject’, Braidotti shows how the 
term has come to occupy an increasingly entrenched normativity 
since the Enlightenment—the leitmotif of the ‘Vitruvian Man’ in all 
his white, Western, male, heterosexual, propertied and teleologically 
progressive capacities (Braidotti 2013: 13–16). Her solution is not 
to simply add more minority subjects to the list of counter-cultural 
categories, but to reformulate the whole edifice through a posthuman 
subjectivity which is both materialist and relational, embodied and 
firmly embedded in specific localities, and above all advocates an 
affirmative ethics of sustainability and social justice (Braidotti 2013: 
51-54). That said, it’s important to note that not all such theoretical 
critique is so optimistically minded. For instance, Elizabeth Povinelli 
has taken the Spinozan/Deleuzean concept of ‘conatus’ (the self-
striving force of universal existence) and added the caveat that such 
persistence also includes a great deal of endurance and exhaustion 
in the face of advanced capitalism (Povinelli 2011: 32). Following 
Braidotti’s emphasis on the importance of the particulars of specific 
bodies/localities, Povinelli traces incidents where material objects 
are restrictive or obtuse, very much not ready-to-hand in the 
Heideggerian sense, and how such assemblages are directly affected 
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by power relations centred on class, race and gender (Povinelli 2011: 
102). Posthumanist theory, broadly construed, thus has the potential 
to be both a descriptively attentive critique of the ‘durative present’ 
(Povinelli 2011: 12), as well as a future-oriented ethical framework 
for social lives to come. 
The dismantling of bounded subjects has also been central to 
studies of human-animal relations, which have explicitly critiqued 
the human/non-human divide central to much Western thought. 
This approach is partly founded in an increasing recognition of the 
independently complex social behaviours and cognitive capabilities of 
non-human animals, from crows to chimpanzees (De Waal and Tyack 
2003), alongside an appreciation of how humans are entangled with 
other animals in complex relational webs, perhaps none more so than 
the companion species with whom we often share our homes (Taylor 
2012). As Haraway (2007) has argued, the meeting of species leads 
to the creation of entirely new forms of subjectivity. Such processes 
of social living are necessarily “messy, knotty and emergent” (Taylor 
2012: 39), and in their consequent dismantling of anthropocentric 
superiority they pose newly explicit ethical quandaries regarding 
how we should treat non-human animals, from diet to scientific 
experimentation (Braidotti 2013: 70; Castricano 2008; Wolfe 2003). 
Taking these cross-species power relations seriously also draws us 
back to critical self-reflection on inter-human social arrangements, 
as exemplified in Charlie LeDuff’s (2003) analysis of how the 
bloody and dehumanising work of killing cattle in a North Carolina 
slaughterhouse is recapitulated in the racial tensions prevalent 
amongst its effectively segregated white, black, Native American and 
Mexican staff.
Anthropology has also recently adopted a more open-ended approach 
to social relations, primarily through the form of ‘multi-species 
ethnography’. Although late 19th/early 20th century ethnographers, 
especially those associated with Franz Boas and Lewis Henry Morgan, 
often concerned themselves with the activities of other species 
(Kirksey and Helmreich 2010: 549–550), anthropology increasingly 
came to view these ‘others’ within an instrumental frame, i.e. their 
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utility for humans in terms of subsistence, technology and symbolic 
representation. Conversely, more recent research has begun to analyse 
the rich realm of actual inter-species interactions in which humans 
are enmeshed, and the new possibilities of agency and subjectivity 
that such interactions engender (Kohn 2007: 4). Eduardo Kohn 
(2007, 2013) in particular has argued for an ‘anthropology of life’ 
that seeks to build a new theory of semiosis founded on cross-species 
communication. In like manner, Tim Ingold (2013) has advocated a 
phenomenological approach to co-habitation and shared dwelling to 
build an ‘anthropology beyond humanity’. At a more abstract level, 
some anthropologists have used alternative worldviews and cross-
species interactions to explicate radical ontologies that completely 
overturn concepts such as ‘nature’ and ‘culture’, particularly the 
‘perspectival multinaturalism’ of Eduardo Vivieros de Castro 
(2014). Perhaps one of the most innovative instances of multispecies 
ethnography, in methodology as well as interpretation, has been Anna 
Tsing’s creation of the ‘rhizomic’ Matsutake Worlds Research Cluster, 
which draws in collaborators from across the global spread of the 
commodity chain centred on the aromatic matsutake mushroom, 
which thrives within ecologically-degraded ‘blasted landscapes’ 
(Kirksey and Helmreich 2010: 553; Tsing 2015).
Tsing’s ethnography again demonstrates a concern with material 
arrangements and social lives that connects a variety of agentive forces 
(human and non-human, animate and inanimate) without privileging 
any one entity in a causal sense. In many ways, this approach is 
mirrored in more recent iterations of systems theory, particularly 
as formulated by the biologist Humberto Maturana (cf. Capra and 
Luisi 2014: 129–143) or sociologist Niklas Luhmann (cf. Wolfe 
2010: 3-29). Such theories emphasise the operationally closed, self-
organising and autopoietic qualities of individual systems, alongside 
their nonlinear, emergent dynamics and necessary openness to their 
environments. Whilst such assertions are becoming increasingly 
popular within general ecological thought, it is so-called ‘deep 
ecology’ which shares most common ground with posthumanism. 
Deep ecologists advocate an eco-centric, non-dualistic view of the 
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planet and its total biotic community, which stresses the centrality 
of relations rather than specific entities, whilst maintaining a focus 
on difference as opposed to undifferentiated ontological monism 
(Zimmerman 1993: 197–200). This stance carries an explicit ethical 
burden, mandating a less hubristic approach by humans towards the 
rest of the world (including each other), and an openness towards 
the inter-relatedness of all life—akin to Braidotti’s (2013: 60–61) 
elaboration of life force as ‘zoe’, or Timothy Morton’s (2018: 54–56) 
‘dark ecology’. The ecological place of humanity has perhaps been 
best crystallised in contemporary public awareness through the 
use of the term ‘Anthropocene’ to define our present era (Steffen et 
al. 2011), which whilst explicitly foregrounding human agency as a 
geological force also draws in myriad other organisms and materials 
in its holistic view of planetary interconnection. 
Lastly, the question of how to theorise inanimate materials is also 
central to posthumanist concerns. Whilst initial discussions of 
posthumanism may have principally revolved around the more 
technophilic developments of cybernetics and/or the augmentation 
of the human body (now often referred to as ‘transhumanism’), 
both posthumanists and related philosophers/cultural theorists 
have since initiated an ever-expanding range of debates centred 
on the physical qualities of existence. Jane Bennet (2001, 2010) 
has proved a particularly popular writer within other materially 
grounded disciplines (including archaeology), and articulates a flat 
ontology explicitly indebted to Spinoza, Bergson and Deleuze which 
espouses a continuity of agentive matter through all of reality. She 
specifically emphasises that all matter is essentially in flux, and that 
multiple flows all coincide and tangle (for a time) to constitute what 
we heuristically identify as stable entities (Bennet 2010: 128; cf. 
Ingold 2007, 2015 on ‘lines’). In such an ontological model, entities 
are ultimately derived from their relations—the claim also made 
by the Deleuzian-inspired philosopher Manuel DeLanda, as well 
as more explicitly posthumanist writers such as Karan Barad and 
Donna Haraway. Whilst DeLanda’s ‘assemblage theory’ (2006, 2016) 
can run to the overly abstract realms of ‘pure virtuality’, in which 
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physical phenomena can become somewhat lost (Kay and Kay 2018), 
he also argues that seemingly specific entities are composed of gestalt 
heterogenous elements, in which the sum is greater than that of the 
parts and accrues its own emergent potential for change through 
further interactions over time.
Both Barad (2007) and Haraway (1990, 2016) similarly adopt an 
ontology based on the premise that all entities are comprised of ‘intra-
actions’. Barad has particularly drawn on quantum physics, and her 
own theory of ‘agentive realism’, to offer a vision of a shifting material 
realm comprised of endlessly entangled relations (Pinch 2011), whilst 
Haraway has used inter-species relations and technological mediation 
to destabilise ideas of boundedness (see above). However, both Barad 
and Haraway have in turn been critiqued on the charge that they 
see relationality as so fundamental to reality that relations appear 
to precede the entities they constitute (Harman 2018: 257–258). 
Graham Harman’s ‘object-oriented ontology’ (OOO) alternatively 
posits that although reality is indeed comprised of objects (physical or 
otherwise) which are formulated through inter/intra-action and have 
agentive capacities of their own, objects themselves are somehow 
irreducible in form, and in a Heideggerian sense are thus always partly 
withdrawn from comprehension (Harman 2018: 52–54). Although 
Harman would never describe himself as a posthumanist, a key point 
of his ontological thinking does link him with those more closely 
wedded to the term. This is his insistence that not only are ‘real’ 
objects always partly withheld from human sensual apprehension, 
but that this is also true for objects’ relations with other non-human 
entities, whether animate or inanimate (Harman 2018: 258–259). 
In this sense, his thought likewise represents a radical de-centring 
of human subjects, and a recognition that not only are we mistaken 
in seeing ourselves as central to the world, but that in many cases we 
may even be irrelevant to it.
Partial as this overview has been, it demonstrates that whilst 
posthumanist (and posthuman-ish) theories may cover diverse 
topics and encompass a great variety of (sometimes contradictory) 
viewpoints, they also share some important common ground. At 
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its simplest, this is a concern with overcoming Cartesian dualisms 
and essentialist thinking. Moreover, there is a general (though 
not universal, see Harman’s OOO) emphasis on the material basis 
of existence, and the ways in which cognition/consciousness are 
specifically located in time and space. There is also a heavy emphasis 
on the processual qualities of flux and instability pertaining to 
physical entities and subjectivities, and the assertion that such 
entities/subjectivities arise primarily through relations and are not 
reducible to essential or stable qualities (though again see Harman 
for an alternative take). Further, there is a broad consensus that 
refashioning ontology involves rethinking ethical relations, within 
and without our own species. Finally, there is a recognition that 
epistemological variety is both desirable and inherently productive, 
as it is through the creative interplay of different concepts and 
disciplines that new ideas are born. On this basis, and departing 
from its cybernetic origins, posthumanist thinking entails a move 
away from cyborgs as such, which preserves a focus on humans and 
their specific ‘improvement’, in favour of Haraway’s more playful and 
ambivalent use of the term (Wolfe 2010: xiii). 
…and its Archaeological Manifestations
The heterogenous nature of this mandate, and the general variety 
of ideas which fall under the posthuman umbrella, in many ways 
mirrors the diverse field of archaeology. It is perhaps then not 
surprising that theoretically-minded archaeologists have increasingly 
drawn on posthumanism in forming their interpretations of past 
worlds. In doing so, they too have added to the broadening corpus of 
posthuman thought in novel and creative ways, sometimes bringing 
internal disagreements with a ferocity to rival the heady days of 
postprocessualism’s early critique of positivism (e.g. Pétursdóttir 
2017, 2018; Ion 2018). A fully comprehensive overview of such 
debates is not possible here (though see Harris and Cipolla 2017 
for an accessible and concise summary), so we instead focus on the 
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broad ways in which archaeology’s boundaries and imagination have 
expanded in response to the posthumanist critique. 
The most obvious, though not necessarily initial, impact of 
posthumanism on the discipline has concerned archaeologists’ 
approach to ‘things’, often taken to mean something broader than 
just physical artefacts. Although archaeology has, of course, a long 
history of engaging with things, the specific novelty of posthumanist-
inspired approaches encompasses a recognition of the affective power 
of material entities. This has expanded our interpretative imagination 
from a focus on the relationship between things and human culture, 
where objects were seen as extensions of (and consequently clues to) 
human thought patterns (e.g. Spector 1993; Tilley; Hodder 1987) or 
political strategies (e.g. DeMarrais 2004). 
Accordingly, approaches that give objects equal billing to humans 
are now becoming increasingly popular, though scholars vary in their 
formulations of such a ‘flat ontology’, ranging from those who hold 
that things and people really are ontologically indistinct, to those 
who think it useful to act as if they are discrete so that we can better 
work out the attitudes of past peoples and their own processes of 
categorisation. Of these many approaches, one of the more popular 
has been ‘symmetrical archaeology’—the form of ‘thing studies’ in 
archaeology that has most explicitly attempted a programmatic 
statement (Witmore 2007) and taken on the nomenclature of a new 
approach. Starting from the premise that ontological distinctions 
or separations are a form of false dualism unreflective of reality, 
symmetrical archaeology’s proponents state that human and 
thing cannot “artificially be sieved apart” (Webmoor 2007: 564). 
Furthermore, as all action is mediated by things (Olsen 2007), so 
human and thing are always already embroiled. Such propositions are 
similar to arguments made within materiality studies and Hodder’s 
(2012) ‘entanglement theory’. However, whilst the programmatic 
statements of symmetrical archaeology blame the false dualism of 
objects and things for the “wide divergences, or hyper-pluralism, of 
approaches characterising current archaeology” (Webmoor 2007: 
568), posthumanism has not reduced this divergence, but instead 
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given rise to a whole host of competing interpretative approaches, 
each with its own tradition and language ready to befuddle the 
unwary.
Some scholars have recently taken the arguments of symmetrical 
archaeology even further, in a move so different from its first 
instantiation that Harris and Cippolla (2017) refer to this as 
‘second-wave’ symmetrical archaeology. This manifestation 
calls archaeologists to pay close attention to things themselves, 
particularly those elements which exist beyond the human (e.g. 
Olsen and Witmore 2015; Pétursdóttir 2017). Things, they argue, 
pre-exist relations with humans, or “hold something in reserve” 
(Olsen and Witmore 2015: 190), and must therefore be studied in 
their own right and not just as facets of human culture. Thus we 
find Pétursdóttir (2017) amongst the surf and detritus of sea drift 
on the coast of Norway, seeking to engage with the objects all about 
her. Her perspective is explicitly founded on Graham Harman’s OOO 
(see above), understanding objects as having a ‘dark side’ never 
actually revealed in our encounters with them. Following Harman, 
Pétursdóttir seeks to build an archaeology which responds to what 
“the current climate is calling for” (2017: 175). This entails conducting 
an investigation which seeks to take objects “seriously” and to “place 
our trust” in them (Pétursdóttir 2017: 199). Instead of an interest in 
the human past, archaeology is here understood as the “discipline 
of resilient things” (Pétursdóttir 2017: 178). The story of human 
interaction with particular objects, even of human responsibility for 
their appearance in a given context, fades into the background. 
It remains to be seen where this exhortation will lead, though we 
remain concerned, as Ion (2018) expresses in a strong critique 
(though see Petursdottír’s (2018) equally forceful rebuttal), that 
humans may become entirely displaced from interpretation. An 
interest in things for things’ sake is certainly valid, but can it fit 
within the broad church of archaeology? Shouldn’t we, at some point, 
return our analyses to the human past, that which we claim to study? 
‘Thing-ology’, though not perhaps the name its proponents should 
adopt, seems to us to be a different kind of discipline altogether, at 
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home in the present or the past, though primarily concerned with 
human lives in neither instance, nor with the trajectory of human 
collectives through time. This seems to be the point at which the 
above approaches diverge from the discipline of archaeology per se, 
at least as far as we understand it. Archaeology has not hitherto been 
the ‘discipline of resilient things’—for instance, fossils are certainly 
resilient, but except in unusual circumstances (e.g. Brück and Jones 
2018) they play little part in our studies (much to the disappointment 
of your uncle at the Christmas dinner table). 
Related to these developments, posthumanist thinking has opened up 
new ways of investigating and recognising alterity in past ontologies. 
Freed from the assumption that ‘types’ as we recognise them are 
somehow innate or universal, alternative ways of understanding 
the world can be explored. Banfield’s (2016) study of the ‘packing 
material’ used at the Neolithic stone circle at Avebury is a good 
example. Here, she recognises a potentially relational set of meanings 
emerging within the Avebury complex which links the stones, and 
particularly their settings, to riverine environments. This is a radical 
re-interpretation of the packing material, previously seen as purely 
functional matter in line with more modern understandings of 
materials and their properties. Crucially, whilst the stone used in the 
packing material and that of the standing stones themselves appears 
to a modern gaze to be the same material, Banfield convincingly 
argues that this was not the case during the Neolithic. She thus 
explores how the qualities of these materials emerge through their 
relationships, and an ontological split subsequently occurs between 
categories which we would otherwise identify as one and the same. 
Posthumanist thinking has also had a large impact on archaeology’s 
approach to animals. Indeed, discussions advocating the agency 
of animals are perhaps the least controversial of posthumanism’s 
developments (e.g. Lindstrøm 2015). Although archaeological interest 
in animals can be traced back to processualist-minded resource 
exploitation models, it is only more recently that a broader range of 
social questions pertaining to animals have been explored. Some of 
this work maintains a duality between humans and non-humans, the 
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sub-title of Nerissa Russell’s (2012) work on social zooarchaeology—
Social Zooarchaeology: Humans and Animals in Prehistory—
demonstrates this perfectly. Under this guise, animals are understood 
to play largely symbolic roles in human society. More radically, 
however, Overton and Hamiliakis’s (2013) identically (and, thus, 
confusingly) titled ‘social zooarchaeology’ takes a more posthuman 
tack. Their approach begins with an understanding of species as 
co-shaping, recognises the agency of animals, and emphasises 
the physical nature of species’ interactions with one another. In a 
similar vein, Armstrong Oma (2018) tracks the assemblage of sheep/
human/dog/house in the Scandinavian Bronze Age and stresses 
the various ways in which this entanglement of species and things 
changed the course of history and created new dependencies amongst 
these various entities. Her book’s title—The Sheep People—is gently 
evocative of this sort of approach, and encapsulates how people, 
sheep, and indeed sheep dogs, acted upon each other and were 
mutually transformed in the process. People who live with sheep—
Sheep People—are different sorts of things entirely, involved in new 
and different assemblages, from those who came before. 
This concept of assemblage (cf. DeLanda 2006, 2016) has proven 
central to posthumanist-inspired archaeology, and in particular has 
enabled an expansion of our understanding of, and ability to deal 
with, issues of scale, both spatial and temporal. Privileging one scale 
over another is inherently reductionist. However, as assemblages are 
never static and operate at many scales at once, the concept brings us 
closer to a real-world picture of cross-scalar movement and becoming 
(Crellin 2017; Harris 2017). For instance, Harris (2017) points to the 
burial of a child as a moment that may inform us of grief or trauma, 
but is also an instance which enfolds changing conceptions of age or 
death over a much longer timescale. The concept of assemblage thus 
allows multiple scales to be engaged with simultaneously, and a more 
complex interpretive picture to be built as a result. 
Of course, such approaches have not been without criticism, and that 
from without (e.g. Lindstrøm 2015; Ribeiro 2016a; 2016b) can be 
as harsh as that from within (e.g. Ion 2018, Pétursdóttir 2018). The 
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attribution of agency beyond the human has proved a particular cause 
for concern. Resistance to this claim is partly based on a conflation of 
agency with intentional action, and which therefore posits agency to 
be a specific quality possessed only by conscious minds. Conversely, 
posthumanism and related theories hold that agency is something 
more like an affective force, which emerges relationally through 
interaction. There has also been a related conflation of ‘cause’ and 
‘responsibility’ (e.g. Ribeiro 2019; Lindstrøm 2017). However, 
approaches that reject a pre-existing ontological separation of reality 
are not necessarily focussed on either cause or responsibility as their 
primary concern. Rather, their interest is in explaining how and 
why objects interfere in the world, and in creating an archaeology 
which recognises things as more than tools. Latour’s famous gun-
person hybrid (Latour 1999, also see Webmoor 2007) recognises 
that the existence of the gun changes the world, and therefore the 
subsequent course of events. Who or what entity/entities ‘caused’ 
the subsequent shooting is only one question we might ask of the 
total assemblage/network. Such imaginative setting up of multiple 
questions and possible modes of thinking is crucial to the creative 
impetus of posthumanism, and is responsible for a great deal of its 
intellectual appeal across the humanities and social sciences. 
Broadly speaking, the concerns of posthumanism thus represent 
an opportunity to expand the discipline’s imagination in a wide 
variety of directions. The resulting archaeologies ‘take seriously’ a 
number of elements of past people’s worlds and encourage us to 
step out of a Western mindset and embrace the alterity of the past. 
Investigating the relationships in which humans were embroiled in 
the past has fostered numerous lines of inquiry which contribute 
to a greater understanding of the lived experience of past worlds, 
just some of which we have been able to mention here. The papers 
presented in this volume represent vastly different approaches, each 
drawing on different understandings of posthumanist thought but all 
bringing us closer to representations of pasts populated by dynamic 
entities, human and otherwise. To begin, Núñez-Garcia provides a 
critique of some of the arguments of posthumanism, particularly 
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those associated with ‘second-wave’ symmetrical archaeology. Her 
work enlivens the production of an iron knife, demonstrating that 
the relationships between the maker and the material are key to 
understanding this process, while also recognising that this need not 
be a relationship of equals. 
For Paddayya, the relationships between humans and a totally 
different material—cow dung—are shown to have greatly influenced 
the construction of places both physical and metaphorical in Neolithic 
India. This turn to a material oft overlooked/underappreciated by 
archaeologists illustrates the benefits of allowing materials’ properties 
and affordances to emerge relationally through our work. Hjørungdal 
next presents an example of how human-animal relations can be 
further rethought utilising a posthuman framework, presenting a 
picture of the co-making of worlds by beavers and humans in the 
Scandinavian Mesolithic, in which humans may not even have 
been the principal world-building species. Matić takes a different, 
more explicitly ontological, tack, arguing powerfully that we need 
to take seriously the ontological claims of past communities, in this 
context arguing that the Pharaoh can be understood to have literally 
become the god Montu when in battle. The joint nature of pharaonic 
being—both human and divine—contrasts nicely with the active 
ruins presented by Leathem in her paper. This fascinating exposition 
explores the possession of people by ancient ruins in the Mexican 
town of Mitla. Here, again, we are charged with taking seriously 
ontological claims which may seem strange and unusual, yet have 
very real and discernible affects in the world. Finally, Oliver Harris 
provides a commentary essay on these papers, neatly drawing them 
together by following the thread of ‘difference’ through their various 
posthumanisms.
Altogether, this volume presents a collection of varied visions of radical 
alterity in both past and present, pointing the way to archaeologies 
which explore the differences between past understandings of the 
world and our own, perhaps even ‘troubling’ (cf. Haraway 2016) our 
present situation to the point of reappraisal. Although inspired by 
posthumanism, it is still people who ultimately remain the central 
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concern of these papers, albeit located within disparate networks, 
collectivities and assemblages of diverse entities and perhaps 
unforeseen affects. In a suitably odd turn of events, such posthuman 
decentring and extension of agentive capacities has led to a series of 
archaeological accounts in which past worlds, and the lives led within 
them, become altogether more alive.
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